Checks, Balances, and Presidential Ambitions
Do legislators with presidential ambitions neglect Congress in pursuit of higher office, or can those ambitions actually strengthen their role within the legislature? In this Quarterly Journal of Political Science article, Christian Fong (Associate Professor at Johns Hopkins University and Center for Effective Lawmaking Faculty Affiliate), Kenneth Lowande (Associate Professor at Rice University), and Ayse Eldes (Affiliate of the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics at Princeton University) examine how running for president relates to members’ participation in the core legislative functions that shape Congress’s standing relative to the executive branch. They find some evidence that presidentially ambitious legislators attend roll call votes and oversight hearings at lower rates, but these same lawmakers are also more legislatively productive, engage in just as much informal oversight, and provide equally informative public oversight. When voting on issues that directly affect the balance of power between Congress and the presidency, ambitious legislators are also more likely to side with Congress than lawmakers without presidential ambitions. Because these behavioral differences continue even after a presidential campaign ends, the findings suggest that they reflect broader characteristics of ambitious legislators rather than a temporary effort to position themselves for the presidency.
To learn more, read the full report here.
“White House” by Diego Cambiaso (2014), via Flickr. Licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0.
