

On the Decline of Elite-Educated Republicans in Congress (Supplemental Online Appendix)

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Abstract

We identify a rise in educational polarization among members of the U.S. Congress mirroring the educational polarization in the American mass public. Over the past half century, the percent of Republican Representatives who attended elite educational institutions declined from 40% to 15%. In the Senate, elite education among Republicans declined from 55% to 35%, while the ranks of elite-educated Democrats rose in both chambers. These changes across the parties have mapped into observable differences in behavior and approaches towards lawmaking. We find that elite-educated legislators are much more liberal in their voting patterns, suggesting a link between the decline in elite-educated Republicans and ideological polarization in Congress. We also demonstrate that, in the House, elite-educated Democrats are especially effective lawmakers, but not so for elite-educated Republicans. In the Senate, we establish a link between the decline of elite-educated Republicans and the rise of partisan warrior Gingrich Senators. Overall, these patterns offer initial glimpses into how political elites are being drawn from different educational cohorts, representing an important transition in American governance.

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Table A1: Variable Descriptions, Sources, and Summary Statistics

| <i>Variable</i> | <i>Description</i> | <i>House Mean (Std. Dev.)</i> | <i>Senate Mean (Std. Dev.)</i> |
|---|--|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Elite Educated ^a | 1 = member attended elite educational institution | 0.272 (0.445) | 0.428 (0.495) |
| Ivy League Educated ^a | 1 = member attended “Ivy League” institution | 0.141 (0.348) | 0.260 (0.439) |
| Ideology ^b | Legislator’s first dimension DW-NOMINATE Score | -0.003 (0.404) | 0.019 (0.373) |
| LES ^c | Member’s Legislative Effectiveness Score | 1.000 (1.508) | 1.000 (1.001) |
| Majority Party ^c | 1 = member is in majority party | 0.563 (0.496) | 0.550 (0.498) |
| Seniority ^c | Number of terms served by member in current chamber in Congress | 5.279 (4.138) | 6.129 (4.634) |
| State Legislative Experience ^c | 1 = member served in state legislature | 0.489 (0.500) | 0.411 (0.492) |
| State Legislative Experience × Legislative Prof. ^c | Level of state legislature’s professionalism for members who served there (= 0 otherwise). | 0.144 (0.182) | 0.083 (0.117) |
| Majority Party Leadership ^c | 1 = member served in majority-party leadership | 0.019 (0.137) | 0.055 (0.228) |
| Minority Party Leadership ^c | 1 = member served in minority-party leadership | 0.020 (0.139) | 0.051 (0.221) |
| Speaker ^c | 1 = member was Speaker of the House | 0.002 (0.049) | |
| Committee Chair ^c | 1 = member served as a committee chair | 0.050 (0.217) | 0.166 (0.372) |
| Subcommittee Chair ^c | 1 = member served as a subcommittee chair | 0.242 (0.428) | 0.451 (0.498) |
| Power Committee ^c | 1 = member served on chamber’s power committee | 0.247 (0.431) | 0.734 (0.442) |
| Distance from Median ^c | Member’s DW-NOMINATE score – Median’s DW-NOMINATE score | 0.357 (0.225) | 0.331 (0.204) |
| Female ^c | 1 = legislator is female | 0.122 (0.328) | 0.100 (0.299) |
| African-American ^c | 1 = legislator is African American | 0.078 (0.267) | 0.009 (0.095) |
| Latino ^c | 1 = legislator is Latino/a | 0.045 (0.208) | 0.010 (0.099) |
| Size of Congressional Delegation ^c | Number of districts in state’s congressional delegation | 18.536 (14.456) | |
| Vote Share ^c | Percentage of vote received in previous election | 67.812 (13.582) | 59.516 (9.212) |

^aConstructed by authors, as described in text. ^bData from www.voteview.com. ^cData from Center for Effective Lawmaking (www.thelawmakers.org).

Table A2: Ideology and Elite-Educated Lawmakers (House)

| | A2.1: Repub. | A2.2: Repub. | A2.3: Repub. | A2.4: Democ. | A2.5: Democ. | A2.6: Democ. |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| <i>Elite Educated</i> | -0.073** (0.018) | -0.069** (0.017) | -0.044** (0.015) | -0.020 (0.012) | -0.032** (0.010) | -0.032** (0.010) |
| Majority | | 0.071** (0.009) | 0.442** (0.012) | | 0.037** (0.008) | 0.020 (0.013) |
| Seniority | | -0.014** (0.003) | -0.013* (0.003) | | -0.002 (0.002) | -0.001 (0.002) |
| Seniority Squared | | 0.0004 (0.0002) | 0.0003 (0.0002) | | 0.00004 (0.0001) | 0.00005 (0.0001) |
| State Legislator | | 0.056** (0.021) | 0.035 (0.019) | | 0.075** (0.018) | 0.075** (0.018) |
| State Legislator × Professionalism | | -0.198** (0.065) | -0.139* (0.058) | | -0.236** (0.046) | -0.235** (0.046) |
| Majority Leader | | 0.070** (0.018) | 0.068** (0.018) | | -0.064** (0.012) | -0.063** (0.012) |
| Minority Leader | | 0.061** (0.022) | 0.060** (0.020) | | -0.024 (0.017) | -0.026 (0.017) |
| Speaker | | -0.005 (0.039) | 0.0001 (0.026) | | -0.048* (0.024) | -0.050* (0.022) |
| Chair | | -0.021 (0.016) | 0.025 (0.015) | | -0.036** (0.014) | -0.037** (0.014) |
| Subcommittee Chair | | -0.008 (0.010) | -0.007 (0.010) | | -0.009* (0.008) | -0.011 (0.008) |
| Power Committee | | -0.027* (0.012) | -0.024* (0.012) | | -0.030** (0.011) | -0.030** (0.011) |
| Female | | -0.069** (0.021) | -0.083** (0.018) | | -0.034** (0.011) | -0.032** (0.011) |
| African American | | -0.019 (0.044) | -0.044 (0.044) | | -0.163** (0.012) | -0.162** (0.012) |
| Hispanic | | -0.059* (0.027) | -0.082** (0.028) | | -0.045* (0.020) | -0.044* (0.020) |
| Delegation Size | | 0.001** (0.0005) | 0.001* (0.0004) | | -0.001** (0.0004) | -0.001** (0.0004) |
| Vote Share | | 0.006** (0.002) | 0.007** (0.002) | | -0.013** (0.002) | -0.013** (0.002) |
| Vote Share Squared | | -0.00004* (0.00002) | -0.00004** (0.00001) | | 0.0001** (0.00001) | 0.0001** (0.00001) |
| Constant | 0.413** (0.007) | 0.179** (0.084) | 0.021 (0.082) | -0.337** (0.007) | 0.197** (0.072) | 0.208** (0.073) |
| N | 5,071 | 4,958 | 4,958 | 5,951 | 5,793 | 5,793 |
| Congress Fixed Effects? | N | N | Y | N | N | Y |
| Adj. R ² | 0.03 | 0.13 | 0.29 | 0.00 | 0.32 | 0.32 |

Notes: Results show OLS regression results with dependent variable being DW-NOMINATE score (lower values are more liberal). Robust standard errors, clustered by lawmaker, are reported in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Results show that elite-educated members of Congress are more liberal, across various model specifications.

Table A3: Ideology and Elite-Educated Lawmakers (Senate)

| | A3.1: Repub. | A3.2: Repub. | A3.3: Repub. | A3.4: Democ. | A3.5: Democ. | A3.6: Democ. |
|---------------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| <i>Elite Educated</i> | <i>-0.116**</i> (0.030) | <i>-0.112**</i> (0.029) | <i>-0.099**</i> (0.026) | <i>-0.036*</i> (0.017) | <i>-0.033*</i> (0.016) | <i>-0.033*</i> (0.016) |
| Majority | | 0.036 (0.021) | 0.247** (0.041) | | -0.006 (0.011) | -0.019 (0.030) |
| Seniority | | -0.017** (0.005) | -0.013* (0.005) | | -0.005 (0.003) | -0.005 (0.003) |
| Seniority Squared | | 0.0005* (0.0002) | 0.0002 (0.0003) | | 0.0001 (0.0001) | 0.0001 (0.0002) |
| State Legislator | | 0.054 (0.044) | 0.005 (0.045) | | 0.088** (0.026) | 0.088** (0.026) |
| State Legislator × Professionalism | | -0.391* (0.182) | -0.133 (0.194) | | -0.319** (0.102) | -0.315** (0.100) |
| Majority Leader | | 0.033 (0.019) | 0.048* (0.022) | | -0.016 (0.021) | -0.018 (0.021) |
| Minority Leader | | 0.030 (0.024) | 0.037 (0.024) | | -0.028 (0.029) | -0.024 (0.028) |
| Chair | | -0.038* (0.019) | -0.036 (0.019) | | 0.027* (0.012) | 0.027* (0.013) |
| Subcommittee Chair | | -0.009 (0.019) | 0.015 (0.017) | | -0.007 (0.012) | 0.001 (0.012) |
| Power Committee | | -0.017 (0.024) | -0.033 (0.021) | | 0.025 (0.015) | 0.025 (0.015) |
| Female | | -0.130* (0.050) | -0.182** (0.048) | | -0.026 (0.025) | -0.030 (0.026) |
| African American | | -0.112 (0.233) | -0.143 (0.164) | | -0.162* (0.063) | -0.160* (0.062) |
| Hispanic | | 0.080 (0.094) | -0.027 (0.063) | | -0.068** (0.018) | -0.065** (0.024) |
| Vote Share | | 0.010 (0.007) | 0.008 (0.006) | | -0.011* (0.005) | 0.012* (0.005) |
| Vote Share Squared | | -0.0001 (0.0001) | -0.0001 (0.00004) | | 0.0001** (0.00003) | -0.0001** (0.00004) |
| Constant | 0.410** (0.015) | 0.160 (0.226) | 0.144 (0.203) | -0.293** (0.012) | 0.058 (0.154) | 0.079 (0.159) |
| N | 1,218 | 1,205 | 1,205 | 1,291 | 1,268 | 1,268 |
| Congress Fixed Effects? | N | N | Y | N | N | Y |
| Adj. R ² | 0.09 | 0.20 | 0.38 | 0.02 | 0.15 | 0.16 |

Notes: Results show OLS regression results with dependent variable being DW-NOMINATE score (lower values are more liberal). Robust standard errors, clustered by lawmaker, are reported in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Results show that elite-educated members of the Senate are more liberal, across various model specifications.

Table A4: Robustness of Ideology and Elite-Educated Lawmakers
Identical Model Specifications to A2.2, A2.5, A3.2, A3.5 with Alternative Elite Metrics

House Republicans

| Elite Undergraduate | Elite Undergraduate University (Excluding Liberal Arts Colleges) | Elite Education (Excluding Attendance at Elite Liberal Arts Colleges from Current Metric) | Total Elite Educational Experiences (undergraduate plus law plus business plus grad—max value is 3) |
|----------------------|--|---|---|
| -0.091*** (0.022) | -0.091*** (0.025) | -0.065*** (0.018) | -0.055*** (0.010) |

House Democrats

| Elite Undergraduate | Elite Undergraduate University (Excluding Liberal Arts Colleges) | Elite Education (Excluding Attendance at Elite Liberal Arts Colleges from Current Metric) | Total Elite Educational Experiences (undergraduate plus law plus business plus grad—max value is 3) |
|---------------------|--|---|---|
| -0.036** (0.013) | -0.032* (0.013) | -0.028** (0.100) | -0.023*** (0.007) |

Senate Republicans

| Elite Undergraduate | Elite Undergraduate University (Excluding Liberal Arts Colleges) | Elite Education (Excluding Attendance at Elite Liberal Arts Colleges from Current Metric) | Total Elite Educational Experiences (undergraduate plus law plus business plus grad—max value is 3) |
|----------------------|--|---|---|
| -0.129*** (0.034) | -0.104** (0.037) | -0.090** (0.030) | -0.073*** (0.016) |

Senate Democrats

| Elite Undergraduate | Elite Undergraduate University (Excluding Liberal Arts Colleges) | Elite Education (Excluding Attendance at Elite Liberal Arts Colleges from Current Metric) | Total Elite Educational Experiences (undergraduate plus law plus business plus grad—max value is 3) |
|---------------------|--|---|---|
| -0.033* (0.016) | -0.028 (0.018) | -0.024 (0.016) | -0.025* (0.011) |

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. Results show that the findings of elite-educated lawmakers being more liberal are robust to many different specifications of measuring elite education.

Table A5: Robustness of Liberal Elite-Educated Lawmakers Results (House)

| | A5.1: Repub. | A5.2: Non-South Repub. | A5.3: Democ. | A5.4: Non-South Democ. |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------|
| <i>Elite Educated</i> | -0.041** (0.014) | -0.088** (0.021) | -0.032** (0.009) | -0.024* (0.010) |
| Majority | 0.062** (0.008) | 0.072** (0.011) | 0.032** (0.007) | 0.025** (0.007) |
| Seniority | -0.011** (0.003) | -0.009* (0.004) | -0.001 (0.002) | -0.002 (0.002) |
| Seniority Squared | 0.0002 (0.0002) | 0.0002 (0.0003) | -0.0001 (0.0001) | -0.0001 (0.0001) |
| State Legislator | 0.023 (0.188) | 0.008 (0.030) | 0.018 (0.017) | 0.021 (0.021) |
| State Legislator × Professionalism | -0.074 (0.058) | 0.009 (0.077) | -0.059 (0.046) | -0.064 (0.052) |
| Majority Leader | 0.040** (0.015) | 0.065** (0.025) | -0.056** (0.014) | -0.039** (0.014) |
| Minority Leader | 0.038 (0.023) | 0.066** (0.024) | -0.027 (0.018) | -0.022 (0.018) |
| Speaker | 0.020 (0.046) | 0.034 (0.047) | -0.058 (0.035) | -0.0002 (0.022) |
| Chair | 0.013 (0.015) | 0.025 (0.021) | -0.036** (0.012) | -0.032** (0.012) |
| Subcommittee Chair | -0.006 (0.009) | -0.011 (0.014) | -0.008 (0.007) | -0.007 (0.007) |
| Power Committee | -0.035** (0.011) | -0.021 (0.017) | -0.032** (0.010) | -0.022* (0.011) |
| Female | -0.047** (0.016) | -0.070** (0.025) | -0.022* (0.010) | -0.017 (0.011) |
| African American | -0.033 (0.051) | 0.058 (0.060) | -0.177** (0.012) | -0.131** (0.013) |
| Hispanic | -0.101** (0.029) | -0.043 (0.038) | -0.060** (0.018) | -0.030 (0.019) |
| Delegation Size | 0.001* (0.0005) | 0.00004 (0.0006) | -0.001** (0.0004) | -0.001** (0.0003) |
| Vote Share | 0.007** (0.002) | 0.005 (0.003) | -0.011** (0.002) | -0.009** (0.002) |
| Vote Share Squared | -0.00005** (0.00001) | -0.00003 (0.00002) | 0.0001** (0.00001) | 0.0001** (0.00001) |
| South | 0.070** (0.014) | | 0.114** (0.013) | |
| Northeast | -0.143** (0.019) | | -0.014 (0.012) | |
| West | 0.052** (0.017) | | -0.010 (0.015) | |
| Constant | 0.147* (0.075) | 0.226* (0.103) | 0.100 (0.064) | 0.061 (0.073) |
| N | 4,958 | 3,244 | 5,793 | 4,138 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.31 | 0.12 | 0.42 | 0.32 |

Notes: Results show OLS regression results with dependent variable being DW-NOMINATE score (lower values are more liberal). Robust standard errors, clustered by lawmaker, are reported in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed); Models A5.2 and A5.4 exclude the South.

Results show that elite-educated members of Congress are more liberal, across various model specifications.

Table A6: Robustness of Liberal Elite-Educated Lawmakers Results (Senate)

| | A6.1: Repub. | A6.2: Non-South Repub. | A6.3: Democ. | A6.4: Non-South Democ. |
|---------------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------|
| <i>Elite Educated</i> | -0.066* (0.025) | -0.135** (0.032) | -0.023 (0.016) | -0.023 (0.017) |
| Majority | 0.011 (0.019) | 0.033 (0.030) | -0.002 (0.010) | -0.003 (0.010) |
| Seniority | -0.013** (0.004) | -0.017** (0.006) | -0.001 (0.003) | -0.002 (0.004) |
| Seniority Squared | 0.0003 (0.0002) | 0.001 (0.0003) | 0.00001 (0.0001) | -0.00003 (0.0002) |
| State Legislator | 0.030 (0.035) | 0.063 (0.059) | 0.044 (0.029) | 0.060* (0.030) |
| State Legislator × Professionalism | -0.376* (0.148) | -0.434 (0.229) | -0.197 (0.109) | -0.248* (0.112) |
| Majority Leader | 0.010 (0.019) | 0.052* (0.023) | -0.019 (0.022) | -0.004 (0.017) |
| Minority Leader | 0.012 (0.021) | 0.037 (0.031) | -0.030 (0.027) | -0.030 (0.032) |
| Chair | -0.022 (0.017) | -0.041 (0.022) | 0.019 (0.012) | 0.017 (0.012) |
| Subcommittee Chair | -0.009 (0.017) | -0.002 (0.028) | -0.011 (0.011) | -0.015 (0.011) |
| Power Committee | -0.017 (0.019) | -0.023 (0.026) | 0.016 (0.013) | 0.032* (0.014) |
| Female | -0.083* (0.033) | -0.163** (0.051) | -0.014 (0.023) | -0.016 (0.025) |
| African American | -0.063 (0.165) | -0.484** (0.030) | -0.150* (0.063) | -0.146 (0.069) |
| Hispanic | -0.023 (0.100) | | -0.032 (0.018) | -0.039* (0.018) |
| Vote Share | -0.007 (0.006) | -0.002 (0.008) | -0.007 (0.004) | -0.006 (0.008) |
| Vote Share Squared | -0.0001 (0.00004) | 0.00002 (0.0001) | 0.00005 (0.00003) | 0.00004 (0.00006) |
| South | 0.107** (0.027) | | 0.107** (0.024) | |
| Northeast | -0.132** (0.038) | | -0.013 (0.022) | |
| West | 0.070* (0.028) | | 0.007* (0.023) | |
| Constant | 0.215 (0.204) | 0.501 (0.261) | -0.104 (0.140) | -0.131 (0.258) |
| N | 1,205 | 817 | 1,268 | 961 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.38 | 0.29 | 0.28 | 0.11 |

Notes: Results show OLS regression results with dependent variable being DW-NOMINATE score (lower values are more liberal). Robust standard errors, clustered by lawmaker, are reported in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed); Models A6.2 and A6.4 exclude the South.

Results show that elite-educated Republican Senators are more liberal, across various model specifications.

Table A7: Robustness of Ideology Results to Ivy League-Educated Lawmakers (House)

| | A7.1: Repub. | A7.2: Repub. | A7.3: Repub. | A7.4: Democ. | A7.5: Democ. | A7.6: Democ. |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| <i>Ivy League Educated</i> | -0.112** (0.020) | -0.105** (0.019) | -0.072** (0.017) | -0.007 (0.012) | -0.018 (0.011) | -0.018 (0.011) |
| Majority | | 0.071** (0.009) | 0.464** (0.010) | | 0.038** (0.008) | 0.022 (0.013) |
| Seniority | | -0.014* (0.003) | -0.013** (0.003) | | -0.001 (0.002) | -0.001 (0.002) |
| Seniority Squared | | 0.0004 (0.0002) | 0.0003 (0.0002) | | 0.00006 (0.0001) | -0.0001 (0.0001) |
| State Legislator | | 0.056** (0.021) | 0.036 (0.019) | | 0.075** (0.018) | 0.075** (0.018) |
| State Legislator × Professionalism | | -0.192** (0.062) | -0.136* (0.057) | | -0.231** (0.047) | -0.231** (0.047) |
| Majority Leader | | 0.073** (0.018) | 0.070** (0.019) | | -0.069** (0.012) | -0.068** (0.012) |
| Minority Leader | | 0.062** (0.021) | 0.061** (0.019) | | -0.027 (0.016) | -0.028 (0.017) |
| Speaker | | -0.006 (0.040) | -0.001 (0.026) | | -0.036 (0.024) | -0.038 (0.023) |
| Chair | | -0.018 (0.016) | 0.022 (0.015) | | -0.036** (0.014) | -0.036* (0.014) |
| Subcommittee Chair | | -0.010 (0.011) | -0.008 (0.010) | | -0.010 (0.008) | -0.011 (0.008) |
| Power Committee | | -0.025* (0.012) | -0.022 (0.012) | | -0.030** (0.011) | -0.030** (0.011) |
| Female | | -0.069** (0.021) | -0.082** (0.018) | | -0.032* (0.011) | -0.030* (0.011) |
| African American | | -0.007 (0.044) | -0.036 (0.044) | | -0.160** (0.012) | -0.159** (0.012) |
| Hispanic | | -0.056* (0.027) | -0.080** (0.028) | | -0.042* (0.019) | -0.040* (0.020) |
| Delegation Size | | -0.001** (0.0005) | 0.001** (0.0004) | | -0.001** (0.0004) | -0.001** (0.0004) |
| Vote Share | | 0.007** (0.002) | 0.007** (0.002) | | -0.014** (0.002) | -0.014** (0.002) |
| Vote Share Squared | | -0.00004** (0.00001) | -0.00004** (0.00001) | | 0.0001** (0.00001) | 0.0001** (0.00001) |
| Constant | 0.409** (0.006) | 0.160 (0.082) | 0.013 (0.081) | -0.342** (0.007) | 0.203** (0.072) | 0.213** (0.073) |
| N | 5,071 | 4,958 | 4,958 | 5,951 | 5,793 | 5,793 |
| Congress Fixed Effects? | N | N | Y | N | N | Y |
| Adj. R ² | 0.04 | 0.14 | 0.29 | 0.00 | 0.31 | 0.31 |

Notes: Results show OLS regression results with dependent variable being DW-NOMINATE score (lower values are more liberal). Robust standard errors, clustered by lawmaker, are reported in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Results show that Ivy League-educated Republicans are more liberal, across various model specifications.

Table A8: Robustness of Ideology Results to Ivy League-Educated Lawmakers (Senate)

| | A8.1: Repub. | A8.2: Repub. | A8.3: Repub. | A8.4: Democ. | A8.5: Democ. | A8.6: Democ. |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| <i>Ivy League Educated</i> | -0.098** (0.037) | -0.097** (0.035) | -0.090** (0.030) | -0.040* (0.018) | -0.035* (0.017) | -0.037* (0.018) |
| Majority | | 0.042 (0.022) | 0.265** (0.040) | | -0.005 (0.011) | -0.021 (0.030) |
| Seniority | | -0.019 (0.006) | -0.015** (0.005) | | -0.005* (0.003) | -0.005 (0.003) |
| Seniority Squared | | 0.0007* (0.0003) | 0.0003 (0.0003) | | 0.0001 (0.0001) | 0.0001 (0.0002) |
| State Legislator | | 0.063 (0.044) | 0.012 (0.045) | | 0.089** (0.025) | 0.089** (0.025) |
| State Legislator × Professionalism | | -0.433* (0.188) | -0.159 (0.198) | | -0.308** (0.102) | -0.301** (0.101) |
| Majority Leader | | 0.040* (0.019) | 0.054* (0.022) | | -0.016 (0.021) | -0.018 (0.022) |
| Minority Leader | | 0.026 (0.025) | 0.033 (0.025) | | -0.027 (0.029) | -0.024 (0.029) |
| Chair | | -0.038 (0.020) | -0.034 (0.019) | | 0.025* (0.013) | 0.025 (0.013) |
| Subcommittee Chair | | -0.016 (0.020) | 0.010 (0.017) | | -0.006 (0.012) | -0.001 (0.013) |
| Power Committee | | -0.015 (0.024) | -0.032 (0.021) | | 0.021 (0.015) | 0.021 (0.015) |
| Female | | -0.133** (0.043) | -0.188** (0.040) | | -0.027 (0.024) | -0.032 (0.025) |
| African American | | -0.096 (0.232) | -0.125 (0.159) | | -0.164** (0.057) | -0.163** (0.056) |
| Hispanic | | 0.098 (0.095) | -0.017 (0.063) | | -0.067** (0.015) | -0.065** (0.021) |
| Vote Share | | 0.009 (0.007) | -0.007 (0.006) | | -0.011* (0.005) | -0.012* (0.005) |
| Vote Share Squared | | -0.0001 (0.00005) | -0.0001 (0.00004) | | 0.0001** (0.00003) | 0.0001** (0.00003) |
| Constant | 0.392** (0.015) | 0.178 (0.222) | 0.157 (0.194) | -0.299** (0.010) | 0.040 (0.151) | 0.059 (0.156) |
| N | 1,218 | 1,205 | 1,205 | 1,291 | 1,268 | 1,268 |
| Congress Fixed Effects? | N | N | Y | N | N | Y |
| Adj. R ² | 0.05 | 0.17 | 0.36 | 0.02 | 0.14 | 0.16 |

Notes: Results show OLS regression results with dependent variable being DW-NOMINATE score (lower values are more liberal). Robust standard errors, clustered by lawmaker, are reported in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Results show that Ivy League-educated Senators are more liberal, across various model specifications.

Table A9: Lawmaking Effectiveness of Elite-Educated Legislators (House)

| | A9.1: Repub. | A9.2: Repub. | A9.3: Repub. | A9.4: Democ. | A9.5: Democ. | A9.6: Democ. |
|---------------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| <i>Elite Educated</i> | -0.072 (0.085) | 0.010 (0.067) | 0.006 (0.067) | 0.132 (0.093) | 0.169* (0.066) | 0.170* (0.068) |
| Majority | | 0.519** (0.056) | 0.443** (0.094) | | 0.447** (0.097) | 0.397** (0.135) |
| Seniority | | 0.023 (0.023) | 0.020 (0.024) | | 0.039* (0.018) | 0.039* (0.019) |
| Seniority Squared | | 0.003 (0.002) | 0.003 (0.002) | | 0.0006 (0.001) | 0.0006 (0.001) |
| State Legislator | | -0.059 (0.083) | -0.051 (0.084) | | -0.172 (0.092) | -0.176 (0.093) |
| State Legislator × Professionalism | | 0.541 (0.282) | 0.517 (0.283) | | 0.474 (0.250) | 0.483 (0.255) |
| Majority Leader | | 0.309 (0.164) | 0.332 (0.172) | | 0.645** (0.211) | 0.647** (0.215) |
| Minority Leader | | -0.117 (0.061) | -0.101 (0.058) | | -0.158 (0.085) | -0.161 (0.086) |
| Speaker | | -0.886** (0.234) | -0.887** (0.235) | | -1.281** (0.309) | -1.268** (0.309) |
| Chair | | 2.946** (0.340) | 2.949** (0.336) | | 2.888** (0.283) | 2.892** (0.283) |
| Subcommittee Chair | | 0.564** (0.072) | 0.567** (0.071) | | 0.868** (0.082) | 0.871** (0.080) |
| Power Committee | | -0.152* (0.063) | -0.161* (0.064) | | -0.245** (0.065) | -0.243** (0.066) |
| Ideological Distance from Median | | -0.276* (0.130) | -0.475** (0.166) | | 0.329 (0.222) | 0.269 (0.249) |
| Female | | 0.045 (0.067) | 0.025 (0.069) | | 0.092 (0.062) | 0.091 (0.064) |
| African American | | 0.068 (0.290) | 0.049 (0.316) | | -0.278** (0.077) | -0.270** (0.077) |
| Hispanic | | -0.032 (0.135) | -0.050 (0.139) | | 0.001 (0.114) | 0.0001 (0.116) |
| Delegation Size | | -0.003 (0.003) | -0.003 (0.003) | | -0.004 (0.002) | -0.004 (0.002) |
| Vote Share | | 0.012 (0.012) | 0.014 (0.012) | | -0.010 (0.013) | 0.011 (0.014) |
| Vote Share Squared | | -0.0001 (0.0001) | -0.0001 (0.0001) | | -0.0001 (0.0001) | -0.0001 (0.0001) |
| Constant | 0.927** (0.040) | 0.047 (0.425) | -0.064 (0.423) | 1.035** (0.047) | -0.288 (0.475) | -0.201 (0.486) |
| N | 5.089 | 4,958 | 4,958 | 6.069 | 5.793 | 5.793 |
| Congress Fixed Effects? | N | N | Y | N | N | Y |
| Adj. R ² | 0.00 | 0.40 | 0.41 | 0.00 | 0.41 | 0.41 |

Notes: Results show OLS regression results with dependent variable being legislator's LES. Robust standard errors, clustered by lawmaker, are reported in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Results show that elite-educated Republican Representatives are not more effective lawmakers, whereas elite-educated Democratic Representatives are more effective lawmakers than their co-partisan peers, across various model specifications.

Table A10: Lawmaking Effectiveness of Elite-Educated Legislators (Senate)

| | A10.1: Repub. | A10.2: Repub. | A10.3: Repub. | A10.4: Democ. | A10.5: Democ. | A10.6: Democ. |
|---------------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|----------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| <i>Elite Educated</i> | -0.020 (0.089) | -0.046 (0.078) | -0.047 (0.080) | -0.015 (0.103) | -0.037 (0.101) | -0.046 (0.101) |
| Majority | | 0.270 (0.139) | 0.022 (0.184) | | 0.276** (0.101) | -0.068 (0.263) |
| Seniority | | 0.098** (0.022) | 0.099** (0.024) | | 0.121** (0.020) | 0.127** (0.021) |
| Seniority Squared | | -0.004** (0.001) | -0.005** (0.001) | | -0.005** (0.001) | -0.005** (0.001) |
| State Legislator | | -0.310* (0.149) | -0.295* (0.147) | | -0.155 (0.169) | -0.165 (0.169) |
| State Legislator × Professionalism | | 2.053* (0.721) | 1.987** (0.715) | | 0.387 (0.751) | 0.390 (0.751) |
| Majority Leader | | 0.213 (0.184) | 0.201 (0.174) | | -0.258 (0.207) | -0.225 (0.208) |
| Minority Leader | | -0.109 (0.069) | -0.109 (0.065) | | -0.088 (0.110) | -0.158 (0.117) |
| Chair | | 0.998** (0.161) | 1.003** (0.163) | | 0.982** (0.156) | 0.992** (0.156) |
| Subcommittee Chair | | 0.108 (0.124) | 0.082 (0.122) | | 0.403** (0.096) | 0.432** (0.097) |
| Power Committee | | -0.095 (0.070) | -0.096 (0.070) | | -0.085 (0.095) | -0.103 (0.090) |
| Ideological Distance from Median | | -0.306* (0.160) | -0.383* (0.176) | | 0.407 (0.256) | 0.410 (0.353) |
| Female | | 0.041 (0.083) | 0.037* (0.088) | | 0.049 (0.161) | 0.015 (0.167) |
| African American | | -0.256* (0.120) | -0.205** (0.160) | | -0.062 (0.104) | -0.060 (0.129) |
| Hispanic | | 0.447* (0.348) | 0.501 (0.340) | | 0.223 (0.142) | 0.206 (0.153) |
| Vote Share | | 0.006 (0.027) | 0.005 (0.027) | | 0.021 (0.031) | 0.012 (0.031) |
| Vote Share Squared | | -0.0001 (0.0002) | -0.00005 (0.0002) | | -0.0002 (0.0002) | -0.0001 (0.0002) |
| Constant | 0.950** (0.072) | -0.301 (0.866) | 0.270 (0.869) | 1.072** (0.064) | -0.564** (1.050) | 0.022 (1.115) |
| N | 1,218 | 1,205 | 1,205 | 1,291 | 1,268 | 1,268 |
| Congress Fixed Effects? | N | N | Y | N | N | Y |
| Adj. R ² | 0.00 | 0.38 | 0.40 | 0.00 | 0.35 | 0.37 |

Notes: Results show OLS regression results with dependent variable being legislator's LES. Robust standard errors, clustered by lawmaker, are reported in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Results show that elite-educated Senators are not more effective lawmakers, across various model specifications.

Table A11: Robustness of Effectiveness Results to Ivy League-Educated Lawmakers (House)

| | A11.1: Repub. | A11.2: Repub. | A11.3: Repub. | A11.4: Democ. | A11.5: Democ. | A11.6: Democ. |
|---------------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| <i>Ivy League Educated</i> | -0.099 (0.105) | 0.012 (0.077) | 0.003 (0.079) | -0.028 (0.098) | 0.082 (0.073) | 0.079 (0.074) |
| Majority | | 0.519** (0.055) | 0.440** (0.083) | | 0.466** (0.098) | 0.412** (0.136) |
| Seniority | | 0.023 (0.023) | 0.020 (0.024) | | 0.036* (0.018) | 0.036* (0.018) |
| Seniority Squared | | 0.003 (0.002) | 0.003 (0.002) | | 0.0008 (0.001) | 0.0008 (0.001) |
| State Legislator | | -0.059 (0.084) | -0.050 (0.084) | | -0.170 (0.093) | -0.173 (0.094) |
| State Legislator × Professionalism | | 0.540 (0.284) | 0.516 (0.285) | | 0.443 (0.250) | 0.448 (0.254) |
| Majority Leader | | 0.308 (0.164) | 0.332 (0.172) | | 0.668** (0.212) | 0.669** (0.217) |
| Minority Leader | | -0.117 (0.061) | -0.101 (0.058) | | -0.148 (0.081) | -0.149 (0.081) |
| Speaker | | -0.886** (0.233) | -0.888** (0.234) | | -1.345** (0.308) | -1.332** (0.308) |
| Chair | | 2.946** (0.340) | 2.949** (0.336) | | 2.884** (0.283) | 2.887** (0.283) |
| Subcommittee Chair | | 0.564** (0.072) | 0.567** (0.071) | | 0.868** (0.081) | 0.872** (0.080) |
| Power Committee | | -0.152* (0.063) | -0.161* (0.063) | | -0.246** (0.066) | -0.244** (0.066) |
| Ideological Distance from Median | | -0.275* (0.129) | -0.476** (0.166) | | 0.393 (0.227) | 0.344 (0.254) |
| Female | | 0.045 (0.067) | 0.025 (0.069) | | 0.079 (0.062) | 0.074 (0.063) |
| African American | | 0.067 (0.290) | 0.049 (0.316) | | -0.305** (0.078) | -0.301** (0.078) |
| Hispanic | | -0.033 (0.136) | -0.050 (0.139) | | -0.022 (0.116) | -0.027 (0.118) |
| Delegation Size | | -0.003 (0.003) | -0.003 (0.003) | | -0.003 (0.002) | -0.003 (0.002) |
| Vote Share | | 0.012 (0.012) | 0.014 (0.012) | | -0.012 (0.013) | -0.013 (0.014) |
| Vote Share Squared | | -0.0001 (0.0001) | -0.0001 (0.0001) | | -0.0001 (0.0001) | -0.0001 (0.0001) |
| Constant | 0.922** (0.038) | 0.049 (0.423) | -0.061 (0.422) | 1.080** (0.046) | -0.321 (0.478) | -0.237 (0.490) |
| N | 5,089 | 4,958 | 4,958 | 6,069 | 5,793 | 5,793 |
| Congress Fixed Effects? | N | N | Y | N | N | Y |
| Adj. R ² | 0.00 | 0.40 | 0.41 | 0.00 | 0.41 | 0.41 |

Notes: Results show OLS regression results with dependent variable being legislator's LES. Robust standard errors, clustered by lawmaker, are reported in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Results show that Ivy League-educated members of the House are not more effective lawmakers, across various model specifications.

Table A12: Robustness of Effectiveness Results to Ivy League-Educated Lawmakers (Senate)

| | A12.1: Repub. | A12.2: Repub. | A12.3: Repub. | A12.4: Democ. | A12.5: Democ. | A12.6: Democ. |
|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| <i>Ivy League Educated</i> | <i>0.015</i> <i>(0.091)</i> | <i>-0.001</i> <i>(0.081)</i> | <i>-0.004</i> <i>(0.083)</i> | <i>-0.073</i> <i>(0.117)</i> | <i>-0.045</i> <i>(0.105)</i> | <i>-0.055</i> <i>(0.109)</i> |
| Majority | | 0.286* (0.140) | 0.043 (0.178) | | 0.277** (0.099) | -0.069 (0.265) |
| Seniority | | 0.097** (0.022) | 0.099** (0.024) | | 0.121** (0.020) | 0.127** (0.020) |
| Seniority Squared | | -0.004** (0.001) | -0.004** (0.001) | | -0.005** (0.001) | -0.005** (0.001) |
| State Legislator | | -0.306* (0.149) | -0.291* (0.147) | | -0.154 (0.171) | -0.163 (0.171) |
| State Legislator × Professionalism | | 2.028** (0.724) | 1.966** (0.720) | | 0.407 (0.771) | 0.413 (0.772) |
| Majority Leader | | 0.218 (0.183) | 0.206 (0.173) | | -0.259 (0.205) | -0.227 (0.205) |
| Minority Leader | | -0.105 (0.071) | -0.104 (0.066) | | -0.089 (0.112) | -0.158 (0.117) |
| Chair | | 0.998** (0.162) | 1.004** (0.164) | | 0.980** (0.156) | 0.989** (0.156) |
| Subcommittee Chair | | 0.101 (0.125) | 0.076 (0.123) | | 0.403** (0.096) | 0.434** (0.096) |
| Power Committee | | -0.096 (0.071) | -0.097 (0.071) | | -0.089 (0.091) | -0.108 (0.086) |
| Ideological Distance from Median | | -0.268 (0.163) | -0.342 (0.181) | | 0.411 (0.245) | 0.415 (0.344) |
| Female | | 0.053 (0.084) | 0.048** (0.091) | | 0.047 (0.154) | 0.011 (0.161) |
| African American | | -0.234* (0.113) | -0.181 (0.155) | | -0.065 (0.103) | 0.065 (0.124) |
| Hispanic | | 0.464 (0.345) | 0.516 (0.339) | | 0.222 (0.145) | 0.204 (0.157) |
| Vote Share | | 0.006 (0.027) | 0.005 (0.027) | | 0.021 (0.031) | 0.012 (0.031) |
| Vote Share Squared | | -0.0001 (0.0002) | -0.00005 (0.0002) | | -0.0002 (0.0002) | -0.0001 (0.0002) |
| Constant | 0.940** (0.063) | 0.264 (0.866) | 0.232 (0.868) | 1.087** (0.060) | -0.587 (1.031) | -0.007 (1.0941) |
| N | 1,218 | 1,205 | 1,205 | 1,291 | 1,268 | 1,268 |
| Congress Fixed Effects? | N | N | Y | N | N | Y |
| Adj. R ² | 0.00 | 0.38 | 0.40 | 0.00 | 0.35 | 0.37 |

Notes: Results show OLS regression results with dependent variable being legislator's LES. Robust standard errors, clustered by lawmaker, are reported in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Results show that Ivy League-educated Senators are not more effective lawmakers, across various model specifications.

Table A13: Elite Education and Vote Share (House)

| | A13.1: Repub. | A13.2: Repub. | A13.3: Democ. | A13.4: Democ. |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| <i>Elite Educated</i> | 0.241 (0.408) | 0.045 (0.765) | -2.149** (0.408) | -2.776** (0.765) |
| Congress Counter | | -0.050 (0.028) | | -0.172** (0.032) |
| Elite Educated × Congress Counter | | 0.004 (0.057) | | 0.064 (0.055) |
| Constant | 65.336** (0.195) | 66.023** (0.431) | 70.540** (0.227) | 72.462** (0.419) |
| N | 4,970 | 4,970 | 5,828 | 5,828 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 |

Notes: Results show OLS regression results with dependent variable being legislator's vote-share in previous election. Robust standard errors, clustered by lawmaker, are reported in parentheses. Congress Counter = 0 in 93rd Congress, 1 = 94th Congress, and so on.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

Results show that there is no relationship between attending an elite educational institution and vote-share for Republicans, while attending an elite institution correlates with lower vote shares for Democrats in the House. These results are robust to the inclusion of time trends and to interacting the *Elite Educated* variable with the time trend.

Table A14: Elite Education and Vote Share (Senate)


| | A14.1: Repub. | A14.2: Repub. | A14.3: Democ. | A14.4: Democ. |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| <i>Elite Educated</i> | -0.508 (0.551) | -0.171 (1.051) | -0.397 (0.526) | -4.606** (0.971) |
| Congress Counter | | 0.161** (0.046) | | -0.388** (0.051) |
| Elite Educated × Congress Counter | | 0.002 (0.076) | | 0.367** (0.071) |
| Constant | 59.193** (0.319) | 57.088** (0.685) | 60.190** (0.376) | 64.648** (0.691) |
| N | 1,205 | 1,205 | 1,268 | 1,268 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.04 |

Notes: Results show OLS regression results with dependent variable being legislator's vote-share in previous election. Robust standard errors, clustered by lawmaker, are reported in parentheses. Congress Counter = 0 in 93rd Congress, 1 = 94th Congress, and so on.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)


Results show that there is no relationship between attending an elite educational institution and vote-share for Republicans, while attending an elite institution correlates with lower vote shares for Democrats in the Senate, upon the inclusion of time trends and interacting the *Elite Educated* variable with the time trend.

Figure A1: Decline of Elite-Educated Republicans in the House



Note: The figure shows the trends in Republican Representatives' educational attainment. "Elite Institutions" matches the display in Figure 1 in the text. The remaining legislators are divided into two groups. "Non-Elite Flagships" captures the legislators who did not attend an elite institution, but did attend one of the flagship universities in their state. Flagships are characterized by being the oldest public research university in a state. All other Representatives (whether they attended college or not) are characterized in the "Non-Elite, Non-Flagship" category. Results show how the decline in elite education is offset across different types of institutions.

Figure A2: Decline of Elite-Educated Republicans in the Senate



Note: The figure shows the trends in Republican Senators' educational attainment. "Elite Institutions" matches the display in Figure 1 in the text. The remaining legislators are divided into two groups. "Non-Elite Flagships" captures the legislators who did not attend an elite institution, but did attend one of the flagship universities in their state. Flagships are characterized by being the oldest public research university in the state. All other Senators (whether they attended college or not) are characterized in the "Non-Elite, Non-Flagship" category. Results show how the decline in elite education is offset across different types of institutions.