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Legislative Effectiveness of Veterans in the House of Representatives: The Increased Effectiveness of a New Post-9/11 Cohort[1]

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Abstract:

There has been a steady decline in the number of military veterans in Congress since 1973. While conventional wisdom suggests that these members with unique experiences would have observable influence on the legislative body, efforts to discover a difference between members with military experience and those without have found null results. In this paper I explore whether or not military experience is related to a representative's ability to push their legislative agenda in the House of Representatives. While military service does not generally increase a representative's Legislative Effectiveness Score, I find representatives with military experience who deployed following 9/11 are more effective lawmakers than representatives without military experience and representatives with military experience who have not deployed post-9/11. This is a significant find given the growing number of candidates with post-9/11 deployments being recruited and elected into the House of Representatives.

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Introduction

Prior to the 2018 midterm elections, Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos made headlines when he donated 10 million dollars to "With Honor," a bi-partisan political action committee (PAC) focused on electing veterans into Congress (Siegel, Lee, and Wagner 2018). According to its website, With Honor's goal is to elect "next-generation veterans to create a more effective and less polarized government" (With Honor 2019b). The PAC's website answers the question "Why Veterans?" by suggesting that those who have served "know how to work hard and get things done" and "often have a deeper appreciation of the gravity of national security decisions" (With Honor 2019a). But do veterans make more effective lawmakers? Does their understanding of national security issues translate to shaping national security policy through legislation?

The effectiveness of veterans in Congress is an important question since the number of veterans was declining steadily until very recently when a new crop of post-9/11 veterans entered Congress. Existing work on veterans focuses on the fact that elites with military experience have unique policy preferences and should impact security policy (Bianco 2005; P. Feaver and Gelpi 2004; Fordham 2001; Horowitz and Stam 2014; Recchia 2015). Analysis specific to members of Congress focus on roll call votes and find no difference in the voting behavior of veterans and

their co-partisan colleagues (e.g., Bianco 2005; Bianco and Markham 2001). Despite the claim that veterans possess special qualities making them more effective, particularly on defense issues, there are few, if any works that evaluate this claim directly.

In this paper I apply use a relatively new measure of effectiveness to evaluate the impact of military experience on legislator performance. Specifically, I use Legislative Effectiveness Scores (LES) to determine whether or not former military members, or the subgroup of post-9/11 veterans, are more effective lawmakers in the House of Representatives (Volden and Wiseman 2014). Legislative Effectiveness Scores are used to identify the effectiveness of either individual members or specific subgroups of members within the House chamber. The focus of this study on the specific subgroup of representatives with military experience. This analysis of LES is different than previous roll call vote analysis, which have shown no significant difference between veterans and their non-military colleagues. LES captures a member's ability to move legislation through Congress as well as their effectiveness in specific issue areas such as defense.

Using analysis of LES and military experience, I present evidence of a substantive and statistically significant positive correlation between post 9/11 deployment and legislative effectiveness in the House of Representatives. While general military service does not have a significant impact on LES, the subgroup of representatives who have deployed since 9/11 are, in fact, more effective than representatives with no military experience and Representatives with military experience who have not deployed post-9/11. Furthermore, this subgroup is significantly more effective in advancing their legislative agenda when it comes to defense issues. This is significant as it provides quantitative evidence that, for at least this subgroup of veterans, military service makes a difference in the legislative agenda in the House of

Representatives. Additionally, this is a cohort that we can expect to increase in size over the next few election cycles.

Veterans in Congress: What We Know and Don't Know

The proportion of military veterans in Congress has steadily declined over the last four decades from a high mark of 73% in the 92nd Congress to 18.8% in the 115th Congress (Manning 2017). Relative to the population, 2001 was the first time this century veterans were underrepresented in Congress (Bianco and Markham 2001). What impact might the decline in veterans have on the legislative agenda in Congress? Do veterans have any effect on the legislative outcomes in Congress?

Much of the literature on military experience in Congress focuses on the policy preferences regarding war and the use of force (Bianco 2005; P. Feaver and Gelpi 2004; Horowitz and Stam 2014) or the preferences of the military and how military elites interact with Congress (Fordham 2001; Recchia 2015). Support for the "Powell Doctrine," which requires overwhelming force, support from the population, and multilateralism, is a constant theme when describing those with past military experience. However, analysis focused on roll call votes provide no evidence that members with military experience vote different from their fellow members of Congress, even on defense issues (Bianco 2005; Bianco and Markham 2001).

Despite this decline of veterans in Congress and the lack of evidence that veterans are different when in office, parties believe that military service provides an electoral advantage (Kruse 2018). Studies on this electoral advantage, however, have found mixed results. In his 2006 analysis of voter turnout from 1972-2004, Jeremy Teigen finds that military service has a positive effect on voter turnout with the exception of those who served in Vietnam (Teigen

2006). In his more recent work, Why Veterans Run: Military Service in American Presidential Elections, Teigen attributes the decline in candidates with military experience to the passing of time from previous large scale wars and the reduced pool of veterans in the population (Teigen 2018). The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan may be changing those dynamics.

The post-9/11 Global War on Terrorism has generated a new cohort military veterans who are running for office in increased numbers (Haslett and Barr 2018) and with increased support from both political parties (Kruse 2018) and bi-partisan organizations (Ignatius 2018; Veterans Campaign 2015). Additionally, a recent study on voter preferences found that service in Iraq provides a strong positive cue to voters (McDermott and Panagopoulos 2015) suggesting that candidates who have deployed post-9/11 are viewed as better fit to serve in Congress. This new pool of veterans and the active recruiting of them by both parties resulted in veterans making up roughly 26% of new Members elected to the House of Representatives in 2016 (Veterans Campaign 2016). With the increased focus on military service in candidate recruitment and the resulting increase of post-9/11 veterans in Congress, it is important to determine what impact this may have on the legislative body.

Data and Analysis

To evaluate whether veterans are more effective getting legislation through Congress than non-veterans (particularly those that served or were deployed post-9/11), I use data from the Center for Effective Lawmaking. The Center provides data on member effectiveness (described below) and I pair this information with data from *Congressional Quarterly* and the *Biographical Directory of the United States Congress* to evaluate the effect of military experience on legislative effectiveness.

Dependent Variable:

The variable of interest in this study is the Legislative Effectiveness Score (LES) of the individual Member of the House of Representatives (Volden and Wiseman 2014). LES provides a quantifiable measure of a member's ``proven ability to advance a member's agenda items through the legislative process and into law" (Volden and Wiseman 2014, 18). LES for a Member is determined by 15 factors. These factors are categorized by dividing the bills introduced in a given Congress by significance (Commemorative, Substantive, and Substantive and Significant) and then tracking them through the legislative process (Introduction, Action in Committee, Action Beyond Committee, Passed in the House, and Passed into Law). Weighted scoring is applied to each Member's bill based on its significance and how far it made it through the legislative process.[3] As a result, both quantity (number of bills introduced) and quality (effort put into getting bills passed) are accounted for in the scoring. To provide context as to the substantive significance of the results presented later, the average LES score within the dataset is 0.997.[4]

The dataset provided by The Center for Effective Lawmaking also includes Issue Legislative Effectiveness Scores (ILES) for the 93rd to the 112th Congress. The calculation of ILES follows the same structure as LES. Bills are scored based on the 15 factors addressing both the significance of the bill and how for it made it through the process. ILES can be used to identify specific issues a Member is effective in legislating, the correlation of ILES and committee membership and, as Volden and Wiseman do in their book, the areas of issue specific gridlock

[3] For more detail see Chapter 2 in *Legislative Effectiveness in the United States Congress.*

[4] LES scores are normalized to 1 in each Congress. This slight deviation from 1 reflects data dropped due to some Members not having an ICPSR because they represent territories and are not full voting Representatives. Table 4 in the Appendix provides the number of observations, minimum score, maximum score, mean, median, and standard deviation for LES scores and Defense ILES Scores in this dataset.

(Volden and Wiseman 2014, 123–55). The ILES is composed of bills characterized as issue related based on the Congressional Bill Coding Protocol. Out of the 19 ILES categories, the one of particular interest to this study is Defense ILES, which is used as a dependent variable later in the paper. Similar to the average LES score, the averages Defense ILES score in this dataset is 1.006.[5]

Key Explanatory Variables:[6]

With regards to military service, there are three primary independent variables of interest. The first, variable Military is a dummy variable coded a ``1'' if the Member has served in any capacity and ``0'' if not. The second, labeled Post-9/11 is coded ``1'' if the Member served in any capacity since the beginning of the Global War on Terror in 2001. The third dummy variable, labeled Post-9/11 Deployed indicates whether or not the Member deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq) or Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan).[7]

Using this coding mechanism, and throughout the text of this paper, I refer to all members who have had any type of military service as a veteran. This includes all five branches of the military as well as active duty, national guard, and the reserves. I make a distinction between those who have served and those who have deployed since 9/11 to determine if there is a difference in

[5] Descriptive statistics for Defense ILES are also included in the Appendix (Table 4).
[6] Summary statistics of all variables are included in Table 5 in the Appendix.
[7] In coding for military experience, I used three sources. First, I combined a biographical data from Congressional Quarterly for the 96th-113th Congresses (Congressional Quarterly 2018) with the LES dataset for the 93rd-114th Congresses. The CQ dataset included whether or not the Member had served in the military and in which branch. To fill in the missing data for the 93rd to 95th Congresses, I read individual biographies from the Biographical Directory of the United States Congress (Biographical Directory of the United States Congress: 1774-Present 2018). If the biography mentioned military service they were coded as a ``1'' in the Military variable. Finally, utilizing data from Veterans Campaign, a bi-partisan organization ``whose mission is to encourage, mentor and prepare veterans for a `second service' in civic leadership'' (for more see http://www.veteranscampaign.org), (Veterans Campaign 2015, 2016), I coded the 114th Congress for military service and added the Post-9/11 and Post-9/11 Deployed variables to the dataset.

effectiveness between veteran Members who physically deployed overseas since 9/11 and those who have not. The variable Post-9/11 Deployed primarily contains those who have served in Iraq or Afghanistan, but also includes deployments to other areas in support of the Global War on Terror.[8] The resulting dataset consists of 9,696 member-Congress observations. Of those observations, 3,844 are Military, 82 have served Post-9/11, and 59 have served Post-9/11 and Deployed. The dataset contains 38 members who have served since 9/11; 29 of these veterans have deployed and 9 have not.

Background Controls:

To account for potential confounders, the models also include a set of controls found to have an impact on legislative effectiveness (Volden and Wiseman 2014, 44). For example, Volden and Wiseman find that factors such as being in the majority party, a committee chair, a subcommittee chair, having professional legislative experience, and increased seniority all have a significant positive correlation with a member's LES. They are included in this analysis as well. Controls for individual characteristics such as gender and ethnicity are also included. In total, all 17 controls used by Volden and Wiseman are applied to provide the most robust analysis.

Analysis:

Based on the structure of the panel data I am using, an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is the most appropriate method to determine the effect of military service on a member's legislative effectiveness score. Given that the focus is the member, all regressions are clustered by member. As mentioned earlier, legislative effectiveness scores are calculated by member for each

[8] For example, Tim Walz's (D-MN-01) National Guard unit deployed to Italy in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Steve Womack's (R-AR-02) unit deployed to Sinai, Egypt. Neither unit went directly to Iraq or Afghanistan, but both members deployed during the post 9/11 era and are therefore coded with a ``1'' in the Post-9/11 Deployed variable.

Congress using the 15 factors and are normalized by Congress to take an average value of ``1" each Congress. I use ordinary least squares regression to determine the correlation of military service, post-9/11 service, and post-9/11 deployment on legislative effectiveness.[9] The results of these regressions show whether or not military service, in general or specifically with regards to post-9/11 service, is correlated with an increase in LES.

Impact of Military Service on Legislative Effectiveness

The first independent variable of interest is military service in general. Table 1 contains four models exploring the impact of military service on LES (models 1 and 2) and Defense ILES (models 3 and 4). Models 1 and 3 are simple bivariate regressions and would suggest that military experience has a significant positive effect on both LES and Defense ILES. The coefficient in Model 1 shows that, without considering any other factors, military service increases a Member's LES by 0.211 points. Model 3 shows an increase of 0.620 on Defense ILES issues. Both of these would be considered substantively significant. Remembering that the average LES and Defense ILES scores in the dataset are approximately one, these results would indicate an increase of more than 21% and 62% respectively. However, at one point around 80% of the House of Representatives had military experience. In many congresses, this attribute was not unique or provide a perspective significantly different from other members. With shared military experience through large scale wars and the resulting draft, we would not expect military experience to cause variation in effectiveness, especially on defense issues.

[9] Legislative Effectiveness Scores are normalized to 1 for each Congress. For this reason, fixed effects are not included

[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]

Once the controls for legislative effectiveness are put in place (models 2 and 4), the estimates become smaller and I cannot reject the null that veteran status has not effect. This is consistent with past research on the impact of military service in Congress. Attributes such as seniority, committee chairmanship, and subcommittee chairmanship prove to be the factors most correlated with effectiveness. Similar to Bianco's findings, Model 4 suggests a slight positive effect of military experience on success in advancing defense issues, but this finding is not statistically significant once all the relevant controls are put in place. Therefore, like much of the analysis on the impact of military service on members of Congress, this result appears to be a null finding.[10] Is there something different about post-9/11 service or deployment that warrants the recent increase in recruitment by parties and support from voters?

A New Military Cohort

In 2007, the first four post-9/11 veterans were elected into office. Democrats Tim Walz (MN-01), Patrick Murphy (PA-08), Christopher Carney (PA-10), and Joe Sestak (PA-07) all defeated Republican incumbents in districts that had been held by the Republican party for years. These four Members ushered into the 110th Congress a new cohort of Members with military experience, one that has been steadily growing. As shown in Figure 1, each Congress since the

[10] This is a null finding as it relates specifically to the effect of military experience on LES. It is possible that veteran members are more likely to become committee chairs, subcommittee chairs, or acquire some other position that increases their effectiveness. These possibilities are also indicators of effectiveness that deserve further attention.}

110th has seen a noticeable increase in the number of Members in the House of Representatives with post-9/11 military service.

[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]

The growth of this post-9/11 cohort reflects the increased effort to recruit candidates with military experience, the increased pool of veterans due to the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Teigen 2018), the positive cue that service in Iraq provides to voters (McDermott and Panagopoulos 2015). As Teigen points out ``the war's size and means of recruiting soldiers are important in explaining the patterns of veteran emergence, as large wars create large populations of veterans, making the chances of military veterans running for office greater"(Teigen 2018, 204). The size and duration of the post-9/11 Global War on Terrorism coupled with the increase of military force structure to support it has generated a larger, and arguably more distinctive group of veterans available to run for Congress.[11]

But is this new cohort any different from members with pre-9/11 military service in regards to advancing their legislative agenda? Using the dataset coded for post-9/11 service and post-9/11 deployment, I reestimate the models and find some evidence that post-9/11 service is positively correlated with a Member's LES. However, it is not post-9/11 service in itself driving this positive correlation. Rather, the subgroup of post-9/11 veterans who have deployed are significantly more effective than all others. Table 2 displays the results with the coefficients of interest in bold. Models 1-3 capture the entire dataset from the 93rd-114th Congress. Since this

[11] Distinctive in that these veterans are part of the all-volunteer force and were not drafted into service as were previous generations of veterans.

new cohort did not enter Congress until 2007, models 4-6 capture only LES scores from 2007 on. This includes the 110th to the 114th Congresses in my dataset.

[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]

Replicating the findings in Table 1, model 1 displays the effect on military service on LES to provide a starting point for comparison. In models 2-6 the variable for military service remains as a control in order to isolate the effects of both post-9/11 service and post-9/11 deployment. Model 2 highlights a statistically significant positive effect of post-9/11 service on LES. With a coefficient of 0.177 and a p-value less than 0.1, the finding is both substantively and statistically significant in a one-tailed test. However, as Model 4 shows, reducing the sample size to the time period in which the post-9/11 cohort is actually in Congress reduces the statistical significance. While this may be a power issue, there is not enough evidence to reject the null.

The positive correlation of post-9/11 deployment on LES however, holds for both samples. In Model 3, the coefficient for correlation between post-9/11 deployment and LES is 0.276 with a p-value less than 0.05. This finding holds in Model 5, even with the reduced number of observations. Furthermore, model 6 displays a distinct difference between the 28 members in the post-9/11 cohort who have deployed and the 9 members who have not indicating that the variable associated with increased effectiveness is deployment experience. Since 2007, when the first members of the post-9/11 cohort entered Congress, members who had deployed post-9/11 have had a substantive and statistically significant increase in LES. With this, there is evidence to reject the null hypothesis, thus identifying an area in which members with military experience, that of being deployed post-9/11, are different than their colleagues.

Having found solid evidence that post-9/11 deployment has a significant positive correlation with legislative effectiveness in the House of Representatives, it would be useful to know if that correlation carries over to defense issues. Perhaps general military and post-9/11 service also have a positive correlation with effectiveness on defense issues. Given the unique expertise acquired through military service, it would make sense that most, if not all, veteran Members focus their legislative efforts on defense issues. Using the Defense ILES we can determine if Members with military experience, and more specifically those who have served or deployed post-9/11, are more effective in advancing defense legislation than their non-military colleagues.

[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]

Table 3 displays the results using Defense ILES as the dependent variable. Models 1, 2, and 4 show there is no evidence that military service, or having served post-9/11 are, in themselves, indicators of increased effectiveness on defense issues. Model 3 shows strong evidence that those who have deployed since 9/11 are more effective in advancing defense legislation compared to the larger sample. In model 5 the statistical significance is lost when the sample is reduced to those Congresses in which Defense ILES data is available and post-9/11 veterans are present. This is likely due to the power issue caused by the reduction in observations. However, in model 6, when controls for military and post-9/11 service are in place, the positive correlation between post-9/11 deployment and member Defense ILES is statistically significant despite the power issue. Similar to the LES results in Table 2, model 6 strongly suggests that those members with deployment experience drive the increase in effectiveness on defense issues.

Discussion

While the expectation of observable differences in behavior between Members of Congress with military service and those without is pervasive within the literature, quantifiable evidence of such differences has been elusive. The findings in this paper change that. This paper provides two significant contributions. First, it identifies a new cohort of more effective lawmakers -- those who have deployed since 9/11. This may have a significant impact on the House of Representatives moving forward as the pool of these candidates becomes larger (Teigen 2018), both parties continue to recruit them (Haslett and Barr 2018; Kruse 2018), and voters respond to cues of post-9/11 deployment (McDermott and Panagopoulos 2015). Provided these factors remain consistent over the next several election cycles, this cohort should continue to grow.

The second significant contribution is that it provides evidence that some members with military experience are more effective on defense issues. As shown in Table 3, those who have deployed since 9/11 are significantly more effective in advancing defense legislation. This may be a result of their expertise, selection onto defense committees, or some other factor. As past research suggests, members with military experience may not be affecting defense policy through their votes. Rather, as this paper demonstrates, they may be influencing it through the legislation they propose and advance. This finding may comfort those concerned with the decline of veterans in Congress and deserves further exploration.

Moving forward, it is important to understand why this group of veterans is more effective. What makes them different? Volden and Wiseman describe ``5 Habits for Highly Effective Lawmakers" (Volden and Wiseman 2014, 167–92) which provides a good starting point in

answering this question. Three may be particularly applicable to this group. The first, "Develop a legislative agenda rooted in personal background, previous experience, and policy expertise", may indicate that those who deployed post-9/11 are focusing their legislative expertise on that experience. This could explain the increased effectiveness on defense issues. Future analysis should focus on committee selection and bill proposals to see if the efforts of this cohort favor defense issues.

Volden and Wiseman offer two other habits that could indirectly be attributed to the experience of working in military at a time of war. Habit 4, "Be open to compromise, even with those who are not natural allies", could result from working in a more diverse environment than the average civilian career. This diversity includes ethnic, gender, and social-economic factors. Similar to the civilian workforce, especially in professional careers, the diversity in the military varies from unit to unit. However, those who deploy have little choice as to who they deploy with and have to develop the ability to work together and accomplish their goals. Additionally, those who deploy often have to work with coalition partners, local government officials, and the local population. These skills may translate to being more open to compromise when working to pass legislation.

The other habit which may result from service in a military at war is "Cultivate a broad set of allies, even beyond the House." Those who deploy to combat share a special bond, even if they did not deploy together. This bond may translate to working across party and chamber lines in order to increase the chances of legislation passage. This broad set of allies may also extend to administration and Department of Defense officials who either also deployed or served in some capacity while the member was in the military.

Each of these deserve further attention and should be the focus of future research. Another factor, which is not directly captured in the habits outlined by Volden and Wiseman is organization. It is possible that the experience of working in the goal oriented, hierarchical military provides members with military experience a different perspective on organizing and managing their office. Specifically, these Members may put a higher value on legislative success viewing it as a quantifiable goal and therefore hire staff focused on legislative outcomes. Evidence of this would include variation in in number of district and D.C. staff as well as variation in the pay of those staff. Staff may be hired based on expertise as opposed to patronage and be evident through variation in the number of staffers from outside the Member's district.

This paper establishes a starting point for future research. The findings that military service does make a difference when that service includes post-9/11 deployment is significant for the reasons already mentioned. Understanding what it is about post-9/11 deployment that makes members more successful may be more important. The discussion above offers some thoughts as it relates to legislative effectiveness.

Tables and Figures (In Text)

Table 1 - Effect of Military Experience on LES and Defense ILES (93rd-114th Congress)

VARIABLES	(1) LES	(2) LES w/Controls	(3) Defense ILES	(4) Defense ILES w/Controls
Military	**0.241***** (0.0664)	**0.0200** (0.0268)	**0.620***** (0.201)	**0.168** (0.180)
Controls	NO	YES	NO	YES
Constant	0.902*** (0.0323)	-0.307 (0.311)	0.747*** (0.0765)	2.236 (1.619)
Observations	9,696	9,383	8,810	8,502
R-squared	0.006	0.420	0.004	0.099

Robust standard errors clustered by members (ICPSR) in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 1-Rise of the Post-9/11 Cohort



Table 2- Regression: LES on Mil Experience, Post-9/11 Service, Post-9/11 Deployment

VARIABLES	(1) 93rd-114th	(2) 93rd-114th	(3) 93rd-114th	(4) Post 2007	(5) Post 2007	(6) Post 2007
Military	0.0200	0.0150	0.0143	-0.00919	-0.0208	-0.00949
	(0.0462)	(0.0469)	(0.0467)	(0.0966)	(0.0918)	(0.0967)
Post 9/11		0.177*		0.114		-0.162
		(0.0993)		(0.130)		(0.165)
Post 9/11 Deployed			**0.276****		**0.236***	**0.384****
			(0.107)		**(0.137)**	**(0.179)**
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Constant	-0.307	-0.310	-0.310	0.786	0.787	0.788
	(0.339)	(0.339)	(0.339)	(0.600)	(0.599)	(0.600)
Observations	9,383	9,383	9,383	2,164	2,164	2,164
R-squared	0.420	0.420	0.420	0.373	0.374	0.374

Robust standard errors clustered by members (ICPSR) in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3: Defense ILES on Mil Experience, Post-9/11 Service, Post-9/11 Deployment

VARIABLES	(1) 93rd-114th	(2) 93rd-114th	(3) 93rd-114th	(4) 93rd-114th	(5) Post 2007	(6) Post 2007
Military	0.168	0.162	0.162	0.146	0.150	0.151
	(0.180)	(0.181)	(0.180)	(0.308)	(0.343)	(0.343)
Post 9/11		0.539			-0.0375	-0.578
		(0.345)			(0.481)	(0.466)
Post 9/11 Deployed			**0.923****			**0.901***
			(0.452)			**(0.544)**
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Constant	2.236	2.208	2.211	0.413	0.419	0.443
	(1.619)	(1.618)	(1.619)	(2.333)	(2.332)	(2.333)
Observations	8,502	8,502	8,502	1,283	1,283	1,283
R-squared	0.099	0.099	0.099	0.149	0.149	0.149

Robust standard errors clustered by members (ICPSR) in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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APPENDIX

Table 4 - Effect of Military Experience on LES and Defense ILES (93rd-114th Congress)

VARIABLES	(1) LES	(2) LES w/Controls	(3) Defense ILES	(4) Defense ILES w/Controls
Military	0.241***	0.0200	0.620***	0.168
	(0.0664)	(0.0268)	(0.201)	(0.180)
Seniority		0.0601***		0.0905***
		(0.00372)		(0.0303)
State Leg Experience		-0.145***		0.0877
		(0.0493)		(0.298)
State Leg x Leg Prof		0.587***		-0.420
		(0.143)		(0.758)
Majority Party		0.467***		0.114
		(0.0382)		(0.172)
Majority Leader		0.502***		-0.429
		(0.0967)		(0.307)
Minority Leader		-0.154*		-0.214*
		(0.0874)		(0.126)

Speaker		-0.689*		0.191
		(0.353)		(0.827)
Committee Chair		3.063***		4.625***
		(0.0625)		(1.041)
Subcommittee Chair		0.757***		1.024***
		(0.0354)		(0.308)
Power Committee		-0.200***		-0.163
		(0.0299)		(0.212)
Distance to Median Voter		0.0543		-0.784**
		(0.0703)		(0.391)
Female		0.0826*		0.233*
		(0.0422)		(0.132)
African American		-0.321***		-0.721***
		(0.0542)		(0.223)
Latino		0.0438		-0.622**
		(0.0694)		(0.254)
Cong Delegation Size		-0.00306***		0.000482
		(0.000989)		(0.00594)
Vote Share		0.0134		-0.0650
		(0.00863)		(0.0471)
Vote Share^2		-9.46e-05*		0.000517
		(5.74e-05)		(0.000346)
Constant	0.902***	-0.307	0.747***	2.236
	(0.0323)	(0.311)	(0.0765)	(1.619)
Observations	9,696	9,383	8,810	8,502
R-squared	0.006	0.420	0.004	0.099

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5 - Descriptive Statistics

Data Sample	Number of Obs	Min	Max	Mean	Median	Std. Dev
93-114th LES	9,696	0	18.686	0.997	0.449	1.561
93-112th Defense LES	8,810	0	101.729	1.006	0	4.638
110-114th LES	2,217	0	18.686	0.991	0.566	1.361
110-112th Defense LES	1,334	0	52.152	1.005	0	3.622

Table 6- Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev	Min.	Max.	N
Military Service	0.396	0.489	0	1	9696
Post-9/11 Service	0.008	0.092	0	1	9696
Post-9/11 Deployment	0.006	0.078	0	1	9696

Seniority	5.282	4.102	1	30	9696
State Leg Experience	0.426	0.495	0	1	9696
State Leg x Leg Prof	0.123	0.173	0	0.659	9674
Majority Party	0.573	0.495	0	1	9696
Majority Leader	0.018	0.134	0	1	9696
Speaker	0.141	0.141	0	1	9696
Committee Chair	0.05	0.042	0	1	9696
Subcommittee Chair	0.244	0.218	0	1	9696
Power Committee	0.251	0.429	0	1	9696
Distance from Median Voter	0.376	0.434	0	1.68	9647
Female	0.103	0.25	0	4	9696
African American	0.064	0.307	0	1	9696
Latino	0.034	0.244	0	1	9696
Cong Delegation Size	18.66	14.24	1	53	9696
Vote Share	68.077	13.66	36	100	9431
Vote Share(Squared)	4821.58	2040.856	1296	10000	9426

Table 7- Regression: LES on Mil Experience, Post-9/11 Service, Post-9/11 Deployment

VARIABLES	(1) 93rd-114th	(2) 93rd-114th	(3) 93rd-114th	(4) Post 2007	(5) Post 2007	(6) Post 2007
Military	0.0200	0.0150	0.0143	-0.00919	-0.0208	-0.00949
	(0.0462)	(0.0469)	(0.0467)	(0.0966)	(0.0918)	(0.0967)
Post 9/11		0.177*		0.114		-0.162
		(0.0993)		(0.130)		(0.165)
Post 9/11 Deployed			0.276**		0.236*	0.384**
			(0.107)		(0.137)	(0.179)
Seniority	0.0601***	0.0605***	0.0606***	0.0455***	0.0460***	0.0456***
	(0.00767)	(0.00767)	(0.00767)	(0.0105)	(0.0105)	(0.0106)
State Leg Experience	-0.145**	-0.142*	-0.142*	-0.172**	-0.172**	-0.172**
	(0.0735)	(0.0736)	(0.0736)	(0.0812)	(0.0811)	(0.0811)
State Leg x Leg Prof	0.587**	0.585**	0.584**	0.590**	0.587**	0.585**
	(0.249)	(0.249)	(0.249)	(0.264)	(0.264)	(0.264)
Majority Party	0.467***	0.464***	0.464***	0.495***	0.496***	0.499***
	(0.0470)	(0.0471)	(0.0470)	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.120)
Majority Leader	0.502***	0.501***	0.501***	0.445***	0.444***	0.443***
	(0.158)	(0.158)	(0.158)	(0.162)	(0.162)	(0.162)
Minority Leader	-0.154***	-0.154***	-0.154***	-0.151**	-0.152**	-0.151**

	(0.0523)	(0.0523)	(0.0523)	(0.0666)	(0.0668)	(0.0666)
Speaker	-0.689***	-0.689***	-0.689***	-0.611	-0.608	-0.611
	(0.267)	(0.266)	(0.266)	(0.454)	(0.451)	(0.454)
Committee Chair	3.063***	3.064***	3.064***	2.865***	2.866***	2.864***
	(0.234)	(0.234)	(0.234)	(0.380)	(0.380)	(0.380)
Subcommittee Chair	0.757***	0.757***	0.757***	0.355***	0.355***	0.353***
	(0.0733)	(0.0733)	(0.0733)	(0.0788)	(0.0787)	(0.0786)
Power Committee	-0.200***	-0.200***	-0.199***	-0.129*	-0.127	-0.127
	(0.0515)	(0.0515)	(0.0515)	(0.0776)	(0.0777)	(0.0776)
Distance to Median Voter	0.0543	0.0511	0.0512	-0.0854	-0.0813	-0.0797
	(0.0974)	(0.0975)	(0.0974)	(0.185)	(0.185)	(0.185)
Female	0.0826	0.0818	0.0812	-0.00941	-0.0110	-0.0112
	(0.0513)	(0.0513)	(0.0513)	(0.0646)	(0.0646)	(0.0646)
African American	-0.321***	-0.321***	-0.321***	0.0588	0.0590	0.0582
	(0.0782)	(0.0782)	(0.0782)	(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.153)
Latino	0.0438	0.0438	0.0435	-0.153	-0.153	-0.154
	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.113)
Cong Delegation Size	-0.00306*	-0.00305*	-0.00304	-0.00209	-0.00207	-0.00204
	(0.00185)	(0.00185)	(0.00185)	(0.00205)	(0.00204)	(0.00204)
Vote Share	0.0134	0.0135	0.0135	-0.00852	-0.00872	-0.00872
	(0.00953)	(0.00952)	(0.00952)	(0.0182)	(0.0182)	(0.0182)
Vote Share^2	-9.46e-05	-9.46e-05	-9.45e-05	2.82e-05	2.96e-05	2.95e-05
	(6.43e-05)	(6.42e-05)	(6.42e-05)	(0.000121)	(0.000121)	(0.000121)
Constant	-0.307	-0.310	-0.310	0.786	0.787	0.788
	(0.339)	(0.339)	(0.339)	(0.600)	(0.599)	(0.600)
Observations	9,383	9,383	9,383	2,164	2,164	2,164
R-squared	0.420	0.420	0.420	0.373	0.374	0.374

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 8: Defense ILES on Mil Experience, Post-9/11 Service, Post-9/11 Deployment

VARIABLES	(1) 93rd-114th	(2) 93rd-114th	(3) 93rd-114th	(4) 93rd-114th	(5) Post 2007	(6) Post 2007
Military	0.168	0.162	0.162	0.146	0.150	0.151
	(0.180)	(0.181)	(0.180)	(0.308)	(0.343)	(0.343)
Post 9/11		0.539			-0.0375	-0.578
		(0.345)			(0.481)	(0.466)
Post 9/11 Deployed			0.923**			0.901*
			(0.452)			(0.544)
Seniority	0.0905***	0.0910***	0.0910***	0.0105	0.0103	0.0103
	(0.0303)	(0.0303)	(0.0303)	(0.0386)	(0.0397)	(0.0397)
State Leg Experience	0.0877	0.0922	0.0926	-0.00664	-0.00802	-0.00704
	(0.298)	(0.298)	(0.298)	(0.362)	(0.364)	(0.364)
State Leg x Leg Prof	-0.420	-0.424	-0.424	-0.0483	-0.0464	-0.0483
	(0.758)	(0.758)	(0.758)	(1.222)	(1.222)	(1.222)
Majority Party	0.114	0.112	0.112	-0.626	-0.625	-0.620
	(0.172)	(0.172)	(0.172)	(0.528)	(0.528)	(0.528)
Majority Leader	-0.429	-0.429	-0.429	-0.354	-0.354	-0.353
	(0.307)	(0.307)	(0.307)	(0.267)	(0.267)	(0.268)
Minority Leader	-0.214*	-0.215*	-0.215*	-0.119	-0.118	-0.119
	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.130)

Speaker	0.191	0.188	0.188	-0.262	-0.261	-0.262
	(0.827)	(0.827)	(0.827)	(0.400)	(0.401)	(0.402)
Committee Chair	4.625***	4.625***	4.625***	5.767***	5.767***	5.768***
	(1.041)	(1.041)	(1.041)	(1.551)	(1.551)	(1.552)
Sub-Committee Chair	1.024***	1.023***	1.023***	0.985***	0.985***	0.985***
	(0.308)	(0.308)	(0.308)	(0.364)	(0.365)	(0.365)
Power Committee	-0.163	-0.162	-0.162	0.147	0.147	0.146
	(0.212)	(0.212)	(0.212)	(0.295)	(0.295)	(0.295)
Distance to Median Voter	-0.784**	-0.785**	-0.783**	-1.617*	-1.618*	-1.607*
	(0.391)	(0.391)	(0.391)	(0.879)	(0.879)	(0.880)
Female	0.233*	0.233*	0.233*	-0.339	-0.340*	-0.340
	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.206)	(0.206)	(0.206)
African American	-0.721***	-0.722***	-0.723***	0.0381	0.0384	0.0342
	(0.223)	(0.223)	(0.223)	(0.267)	(0.268)	(0.268)
Latino	-0.622**	-0.621**	-0.621**	-0.516*	-0.517*	-0.517*
	(0.254)	(0.254)	(0.254)	(0.292)	(0.291)	(0.292)
Cong Delegation Size	0.000482	0.000471	0.000476	0.00737	0.00739	0.00742
	(0.00594)	(0.00594)	(0.00594)	(0.00960)	(0.00965)	(0.00965)
Vote Share	-0.0650	-0.0643	-0.0644	0.0461	0.0460	0.0451
	(0.0471)	(0.0471)	(0.0471)	(0.0647)	(0.0646)	(0.0647)
Vote Share^2	0.000517	0.000513	0.000514	-0.000444	-0.000443	-0.000437
	(0.000346)	(0.000346)	(0.000346)	(0.000429)	(0.000429)	(0.000430)
Constant	2.236	2.208	2.211	0.413	0.419	0.443
	(1.619)	(1.618)	(1.619)	(2.333)	(2.332)	(2.333)
Observations	8,502	8,502	8,502	1,283	1,283	1,283
R-squared	0.099	0.099	0.099	0.149	0.149	0.149

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1